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1.  Introduction 
Since  procyclicality  has  diverse  sources  and  mechanisms,  we  also  need  a  variety  of 
countercyclical tools. We may categorise  them  in  accordance  with  the asset,  liability  and 
capital sides of the balance sheet that they primarily affect. 
This  paper  provides  a  comparative  assessment  of  countercyclical  tools  through  the 
establishment of an assessment criterion: controllability, which we think is most relevant to 
policy objectives. We select a representative tool from each side of the balance sheet and 
conduct  an  assessment. We  show that  the  assessment  results  vary  depending  upon  the 
financial conditions of financial institutions and markets, and that different tools may be more 
effective  under  different  conditions.  Given  a  certain  set  of  financial  conditions,  therefore, 
multiple tools may be deployed in a complementary fashion. 
This paper is organised as follows. First, we examine the countercyclical tools proposed from 
the  perspective  of  the  balance  sheets  of  financial  institutions.  Second,  we  discuss  the 
assessment  standards.  Third,  we  compare  and  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  these 
countercyclical tools, based upon their ability to control financial institutions’ assets. Fourth, 
we conduct a comparative assessment of various countercyclical tools with data on financial 
institutions in Korea. Finally, we explore some policy implications. 
2.  Countercyclical policy tools 
The  procyclicality  inherent  in  the  financial  system  may  be  exacerbated  by  various 
microprudential regulations and accounting standards. Minimum capital requirements, loan 
loss  provisioning,  liquidity  regulations  and  fair  value  accounting  can  be  pointed  to  as 
examples. It is therefore necessary to come up with  various tools to counter and mitigate 
procyclicality  originating  from  different  sources. Since  factors  affecting  procyclicality  bring 
about  changes  in  the  balance  sheets  of  financial  institutions,  we  may  categorise 
countercyclical tools based upon the sides of the balance sheet they primarily target, that is, 
capital, liabilities and assets. 
In our paper, we select a representative tool from each side of the balance sheet (Table 1). 
We  choose  the  capital  buffer,  a  countercyclical  tool  from  the  capital  side,  to  reduce 
procyclicality arising from regulatory capital and loan loss provisioning. As a tool to counter 
the  procyclicality  originating  from  liquidity  regulation,  through  fluctuations  in  funding,  the 
liquidity buffer is selected  on the liability side. Finally, for procyclical movements in asset 
values, particularly in relation to fair value accounting, we choose the asset-based reserve 
requirement (ABBR), which directly targets the asset side. 
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Countercyclical policy tools 
Funding perspective 
Capital side  •  Capital buffer 
Liquidity side  •  Liquidity buffer 
Investment perspective  Asset side  •  ABRR 
 
The capital buffer is a policy tool that can alleviate procyclicality through the accumulation of 
additional capital countercyclically, in addition to the minimum capital ratio. In other words, 
the  authorities  increase  the  capital  reserve  burdens  of  financial  institutions  by  raising  the 
capital  buffer  ratio  requirement  during  economic  booms,  and  by  doing  so  deter  credit 
expansion in the financial system. During an economic recession, the authorities can then 
lessen the extent of deleveraging by reducing the capital buffer ratio to allow a decline in 
financial institutions’ total capital ratio requirement. 
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where K stands for the total capital requirement ratio, K* the minimum capital  requirement 
ratio, α the buffer ratio, E regulatory capital, w the average risk weight, and A total assets. 
The liquidity buffer is a tool that regulates a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)
2 countercyclically, 
mandating that a financial institution holds high-quality liquid assets against the possibility of 
massive funding outflows under an acute short-term stress scenario. The way in which the 
liquidity buffer is managed is similar to that with the capital buffer. Credit expansion during an 
economic boom is curbed by setting the LCR higher than 100%, while a credit crunch during 
a downturn is prevented by setting it lower than 100%. 
    (    )                                                                (2) 
     
  
     
       
where L stands for the overall liquidity ratio, β the buffer ratio, A
h high-quality liquid assets, s 
the run-off rate, and D net cash outflow for 30 days. 
The ABRR is a tool by which reserve requirements are imposed on total assets or specific 
assets of financial institutions when asset prices in the financial markets fluctuate sharply. It 
is similar to the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in that it aims to control financial institutions’ assets 
directly, but different from the capital and liquidity buffers that seek to control assets indirectly 
through restricting the capital and liquidity ratios. 
                                                                               (3) 
A
NR = f(P – P*); f′ > 0 
where R stands for reserve requirements, r the reserve requirement ratio, A
NR non-reserve 
requirement assets (total assets or specific assets), P the asset price growth rate, and P* the 
long-term average asset price growth rate. 
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3.  Assessment framework 
3.1  Criteria for countercyclical tool assessment 
We may assess countercyclical tools in terms of their cost-effectiveness. For effectiveness, 
the assessment criteria may include the controllability over financial institutions’ assets – the 
direct source  of credit in the financial system  – and the implementability of tools through 
lower resistance from financial institutions. Meanwhile, countercyclical regulations also entail 
costs to both financial institutions and markets, because they limit business activities and 
distort market prices. 
In our study, however, we assess countercyclical tools based solely upon their effectiveness 
in controlling asset fluctuations at individual financial institutions.  Above all, countercyclical 
policy tools should be effective in achieving the policy goal, ie leaning against the excessive 
build-up  of  lending  and  investment  in  assets  by  financial  institutions,  which  is  the  culprit 
behind asset price and credit aggregate fluctuations in the financial system, so as to alleviate 
credit and business cycle amplitude. Controllability over the assets of financial institutions 
should therefore be the main assessment criterion. 
3.2  Framework 
In order to assess the controllability of countercyclical tools, we need to set up a framework 
for  analysing  the  response  function  of  financial  institutions.  The  effects of  countercyclical 
regulations may vary depending upon how financial institutions respond to them. We assume 
that financial institutions maximise economic value added (EVA)
3 and derive optimal levels of 
assets (A), liabilities (D), and capital (E) at equilibrium as follows: 
Max EVA = rA – (c1D + c2E)                                                   (4) 
In equilibrium : EVA* = rA* – (c1D* + c2E*) 
where r stands for the return on assets, A assets, c1 the unit cost of debt, c2 the unit cost of 
equity, rA net operating profits after taxes, c1D the cost of debt, and c2E the cost of equity. 
We treat as given the market conditions: r, c1 and c2.  
When regulations are imposed, financial institutions have to make portfolio adjustments in 
their  balance  sheets.  This  causes  assets,  liabilities  and/or  capital  to  deviate  from  their 
optimal  levels.  They  then  have  an  EVA  lower  than  EVA
*  and  incur  adjustment  costs.  If 
different options for responding to the regulations are available to financial institutions, for 
instance if they  either raise capital, lower assets or lower risk weights in response to  the 
imposition of a capital buffer, they will choose the option with the lowest adjustment costs. 
Min Adjustment Cost(κ) = {EVA* – EVA(κ)}                                  (5) 
where κ is the option chosen by the financial institutions. 
Table 2 shows the EVA for each option that financial institutions can take in response to the 
impositions  of  higher  capital  buffers,  liquidity  buffers  and  reserve  requirements  during  an 
economic boom. Notice that three options are available for responding to a capital buffer: ∆E, 
∆A  and  ∆w.  Financial  institutions  can  lower  the  average  risk  weight  w  by  reducing  the 
proportion of risky assets A2. In order to meet a higher liquidity buffer requirement, they may 
either increase high-quality liquid assets Ah, or decrease net cash outflows by reducing the 
                                              
3   EVA, a measure of economic profit, is calculated as the difference between net operating profit after taxes and 
the opportunity cost of invested capital. This opportunity cost is determined by the weighted average cost of 
debt and equity (WACC). See www.sternstewart.com and Salmi and Virtanen (2001). 100  BIS Paper No 60 
 
 
average net run-off rate s, which can be done through shifting wholesale funding D2 to retail 
deposits  D1.  For  ABRR,  the  only  option  available  is  to  reduce  non-reserve  requirement 
assets A
NR in proportion to the reserve ratio α. We exclude the possibility of raising liabilities 
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Table 3 shows the adjustment costs, the difference between EVA* and EVA, for each option 
for responding to the different policy tools. They are the product of adjustment size and unit 
cost. The adjustment size is determined by the structure of the balance sheets of financial 
institutions and the unit cost by market conditions. Looking at the capital buffer, for instance, 
the adjustment costs of the three options depend on the adjustment sizes – ∆E, ∆A, and ∆A2 – 
and the unit costs – r, c1, c2, r1 and r2. We therefore argue that financial conditions, which 
determine the adjustment costs facing financial institutions in their response to regulations, are BIS Paper No 60  101 
 
 
key  to  the  effectiveness  of  tools  in  controlling  asset  fluctuations.  Figure  1  provides  an 




Adjustment costs (EVA*– EVA) 
Tool  capital buffer  liquidity buffer  ABRR 
Adjustment size (a)  ∆E  ∆A  ∆A2  ∆A1  ∆D2  ∆ANR 
Unit cost (b)  c2–r  r–c1  r2–r1  ro–rh  C11–c12  rNR–rR 
Adjustment cost (a*b)  ∆E(c2–r)  ∆A(r–c1)  ∆A2(r2–r1)  ∆Ah(ro–rh)  ∆D2(c11–c 12)  ∆ANR(rNR–rR) 
 
Figure 1 
Financial institutions’ responses to imposition of regulations 
 
4.  Comparative assessment of tools in controlling the target 
In accordance with the criterion and the framework set up above, we would like to assess the 
controllability of each policy tool over the asset side of financial institutions’ balance sheets. 
The controllability over financial institutions’ assets may differ depending upon the type of 
policy  tool  being  employed.  That  is,  depending  upon  whether  the  policy  tool  can  control 
assets directly or indirectly, and upon how many variables are subject to control, financial 
institutions  can make  choices  differently  from the  authorities’  intentions. For  instance,  the 
less directly assets are controlled by using capital and liabilities, and the larger the number of 
variables subject to control, the less the degree of controllability. However, the specific ability 
to control may also differ depending upon the financing and investment structure of each 
individual financial institution, as dictated by financial conditions. 102  BIS Paper No 60 
 
 
4.1  Capital buffer imposition 
We  would  like  to  consider  how  far  the  authorities  can  control  the  assets  of  financial 
institutions effectively when it adjusts the capital buffer ratio countercyclically. 
In  Equation  (1),  when  the  authorities  choose  the  policy  of  revising  up  K,  the  aggregate 
regulatory capital ratio, a financial institution may increase its K by reducing A. However, it 
can also increase K by expanding E or by reducing w. In the latter case, the assets of the 
financial institution do not decrease, while when E is expanded its assets could rather rise.  
Which  variables  among  A,  E,  and  w  that  financial  institutions  choose  in  response  to  an 
upward  revision  of  the  aggregate  regulatory  capital  ratio  may  differ,  depending  upon  the 
financing and investment structures of the financial institutions and the cost of capital. We 
would like to examine this in detail below. 
4.1.1  Adjustment cost comparison: expanding E and reducing A 
First, we investigate which method financial institutions would select for responding to capital 
buffer imposition, between a capital increase and an asset reduction. Using the adjustment 
cost as summarised above in Table 3, financial institutions could compare the adjustment 
cost of a capital increase with that of an asset reduction. 
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In Equation (6), we can see that the higher the leverage (A/E) of financial institutions and the 
lower  the  risk  premium  ((c2–r)/(r–c1))  in  the  financial  market
4,  the  more  likely  financial 
institutions are to choose the capital increase instead of the asset reduction. 
4.1.2  Adjustment cost comparison: reducing w and reducing A 
In the same way, in response to a rise in the capital buffer ratio, financial institutions could 
compare the adjustment cost of a decrease in risk weightings with that of an asset reduction: 
①                       ②                        (     )    (       )        (7) 
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In Equation  (7),  we  find that  the  smaller  γ,  ie  the  bigger  the  difference  between  riskless 
assets and risky assets, and the smaller w/A, then the smaller ∆A2/∆A, and the more likely 
financial institutions are to choose to reduce w. Meanwhile, looking at the relative adjustment 
cost  (=(r–c1)/(r2–r1)), we  can  see  that  the  lower  the  risk  premium  (=r2–r1)  in  the  financial 
markets, and the higher the rate of return on assets against the cost of debt (=r–c1), the more 
likely financial institutions are to take actions to reduce their risk weights by changing asset 
composition (eg cutting down SME loans and attracting more mortgage loans) rather than to 
reduce assets. 
                                              
4   c2 (= cost of equity) can be estimated by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Looking at this framework, it 
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4.2  Liquidity buffer imposition 
Let us now look into how effectively countercyclical adjustment of the liquidity buffer ratio by 
the  authorities  can  control  financial  institutions’  assets.  For  convenience  of  analysis,  we 
simplify  the  liquidity  buffer  as  Equation  (2);  the  only  differences  compared  to  the  capital 
buffer ratio are that we impose weights on liabilities rather than assets, and that we hold 
high-quality liquid assets in order to absorb shock. 
Looking at Equation (2), when the authorities raise L, financial institutions can respond by 
increasing A
h or decreasing s or D. One way of reducing s is to replace riskier liabilities such 
as wholesale funding with riskless ones including cash. If financial institutions increase A
h, 
they should reduce other assets (investments and loans), on the condition that A is constant. 
When they reduce D, A declines on the condition that E is constant. After considering the 
adjustment costs of these options, financial institutions will choose the option with the lowest 
cost. 
Let  us  look  at  which  strategy,  between  an  increase  in  A
h  or  a  reduction  in  s,  financial 
institutions will choose in response to liquidity buffer imposition, depending upon financial 
conditions. In order to comply with this liquidity regulation, they can raise A
h or reduce s, and 
will as a result compare the adjustment costs of those two options: 
①                         ②                        (       )      (         )         (8) 
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The  lower  δ,  which means  the  difference  between  the  run-off  rate  of  core  liabilities  and 
non-core  liabilities,  and  the  lower  the  average  run-off  rate  s,  the  higher  the  possibility  of 
reducing  non-core  liabilities  rather  than  increasing  high-quality  liquid  assets.  Meanwhile, 
looking at the relative adjustment cost (=(ro–rh)/(c11–c12)), the higher the opportunity cost of 
expanding liquid assets, and the larger the difference between the funding rates of core and 
non-core liabilities, the higher the possibility of reducing non-liabilities rather than increasing 
high-quality liquid assets. In this condition, the effectiveness of the liquidity buffer could be 
limited. 
5.  Empirical analysis 
In Section 4 we made a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of countercyclical tools 
based upon this criterion: controllability over financial institutions’ assets. We showed that 
this  controllability  varies  with  financial  conditions  including  the  cost  of  capital  and  the 
structure  of  funding  and  investment. In this  section, we  provide  an  empirical  analysis  on 
financial institutions’ responses to capital buffer and liquidity buffer impositions in boom times, 
using the “minimisation of EVA adjustment costs” model and the data for financial conditions 
of banks in Korea at the end of 2009 (Table 4).
5 
                                              
5   We  compiled  data  for  analysing  the  capital  buffer  from  seven  nationwide  banks, six  local  banks  and  four 
special banks. For the liquidity buffer, we acquired data from the QIS conducted by the BCBS, which are from 













Average risk weight 
(w) 
11.9%  123  1,769  63.7% 
       
L  High-quality liquid 
Assets (A
h) 
Net run-off rate 
(s) 
Net run-off liability 
(D) 
100%  105.4  34.9%  302.5 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service of Korea. 
 
5.1  Capital buffer’s controllability 
We know that if the authorities adjust K upward, banks will choose to either reduce A, raise 
E, or reduce w – based upon the adjustment cost. As shown in Table 5, in the case where 
regulators increase K by 1%p, financial institutions should respond by either increasing E by 
11.3 trillion won, decreasing A by 148.3 trillion won, or decreasing A2
6 by 104.9 trillion won. 
The unit cost of ∆E, measured by the difference between the cost of equity and the rate of 
return on assets, is at the 2.6%p level. The unit cost of –△A, the difference between the rate 
of return on assets and the cost of debt, is meanwhile approximately 0.2%p, and the unit cost 
of –∆w, the difference between the three-year corporate bond and three-year Treasury bond 
yields, is at the 1.1%p level.  
 
Table 5 
Adjustment cost comparison 
(won trillions) 
Option  ∆E  ∆A  ∆w  ∆A2 





Unit cost (b)  2.6%p  0.2%p    1.1%p 
Adjustment cost (a*b)  0.2  0.3    1.2 
1 ∆E = (wA) ∆K = 63.7% x 1,769 trillion won  x 1%p = 11.3 trillion won 
2 ∆A = –(A/K) ∆K = –(1,769 trillion won÷11.9%) x 1%p = –148.3 trillion won 
3 ∆w = –(w/K)∆K = –(63.7%÷11.9%) x 1%p = –5.3% 
4 ∆A2 = ∆w{A/(w2–w1)} = –5.3% x {1,769 trillion won÷ (1.0–0.1)} = –104.9 trillion won 
 
                                              
6   With the 1%p increase of K, banks should cut w by 5.75%p. To do so, they should replace risky with riskless 
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Thus, the adjustment cost incurred by △E is 0.2 trillion won ( = 11.3 × 2.6%p), that incurred 
by –△A is 0.3 trillion won (=148.3 × 0.2%p), and that incurred by –△w is 1.2 trillion won. △E 
is therefore the option with the lowest adjustment costs. Because of high leverage, “reducing 
assets” entails much larger adjustment sizes than the optimal option, despite the lower unit 
costs. Overall, for Korean banks, it is a rational choice to expand E instead of reducing either 
A or w. 
5.2  Liquidity buffer’s controllability 
In response to an increase by the authorities in the level of L, financial institutions may either 
increase their proportions of A
h or reduce their s. In Korea, L has been under 100% – the 
minimum level required by the BCBS – and we thus adjust L to 100% by raising A
h, D and s 
proportionally. As shown in Table 4, A
h is 105.4 trillion won, D is 302.5 trillion won, and s is 
34.9%. In the cases where the authorities increase L by 10%p, banks can respond by either 
increasing A
h by 10.5 billion won or reducing s by 3.2%p (Table 6). In order to reduce s, they 
should  change  their  non-core  liabilities,  which  have  high  run-off  rates,  into  core  liabilities 
such as deposits that have low run-off rates. The amount of x transferred into core liabilities 
in order to reduce s by 3%p can be calculated as follows:  
         
 
       
 
 
                                                            (9) 
In equation (9), the 0.05 and 1.0 are the run-off rates of core liabilities and non-core liabilities, 
respectively, estimated conservatively. x is then 10.1 trillion won. This amount is close to that 
of  ∆A
h,  and  the  choice  of  whether  to  increase  ∆A
h  or  reduce  s  thus  depends  upon  the 
adjustment costs of ∆A
h and of converting non-core into core liabilities. 
The unit cost of ∆A
h, measured by the difference between the one-year Treasury bond yield 
and  the  one-year  bank  lending  rate,  is  at  the  1.1%p  level.  The  unit  cost  of  converting 
non-core liabilities with the one-year bank debenture rate into core liabilities with the one-
year  bank  deposit  rate  is  meanwhile  around  0.4%p.  Thus, the  adjustment cost  of  ∆A
h  is 
11.6 trillion  won  (  =  10.5  ×  1.1%p),  and  that  of  converting  non-core  into  core  liabilities 
4.0 trillion won ( = 10.1 × 0.4%p). It is therefore more effective for financial institutions to 
choose reducing s over increasing ∆A
h, since the adjustment cost of ∆A
h is greater. 
 
Table 6 
Adjustment cost with LCR 10%p increase 
      (won trillions) 
option  ∆A
h  ∆s  ∆D2 




Unit cost (b)  1.1%p    0.4%p 
Adjustment cost (a*b)  11.6    4.0 
1 ∆A
h = sD∆L = 34.9% x 302.5 trillion won x 10%p = 10.5 trillion won 
2 ∆s = –(s/L)∆L = –(34.9%/110%) x 10%p = –3.2%p 
3 ∆D2 = –(w/K)∆K = –(63.7%/11.9%) x 1%p = –5.3% 106  BIS Paper No 60 
 
 
6.  Policy implications 
In this paper, we find that the effectiveness of countercyclical tools will vary depending upon 
financial institutions’ responses to the regulations. Financial institutions have diverse options 
for dealing with charges for the capital buffer and the liquidity buffer.  
Financial institutions aiming to maximise EVA will choose the option with the lowest portfolio 
adjustment costs. The portfolio adjustment costs depend upon the balance sheet structures 
of financial institutions and market conditions.  
Countercyclical  tools  such  as  the capital  buffer  and  the  liquidity  buffer  could  not work  as 
expected  when  financial  institutions,  given  all  of  the  economic  and  financial  conditions, 
choose  the  option  with  the  lowest  adjustment  costs.  Thus,  in  order  to  maximise  the 
effectiveness of countercyclical tools, we should implement various tools in a complementary 
way, in consideration of financial conditions. 
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